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Intangible Assets: Computers and
Organizational Capital
In developed economies, production requires not only such traditional
factors as capital and labor but also skills, organizational structures and
processes, culture, and other factors collectively referred to as “intangible
assets.” Detailed investigation of some of these types of assets has found
that they are often large in magnitude and have important productivity
beneﬁts. For example, Dale Jorgenson and Barbara Fraumeni found that
the stock of human capital in the U.S. economy dwarfs that of physical
capital and has grown over time.1 Bronwyn Hall, Zvi Griliches, and
Baruch Lev and Theodore Sougiannis found evidence that research and
development (R&D) assets bring benefits in the form of positive mar-
ginal product and market valuation.2 Timothy Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson,
and Hitt have found that certain organizational practices, when combined
with investments in information technology (IT), were associated with
signiﬁcant increases in productivity in the late 1980s and early 1990s.3
Investors also attempt to incorporate intangible assets into their valua-
tion of ﬁrms, and this is one reason that the market value of a ﬁrm may
differ markedly from the value of its tangible assets alone. In particular,
stock market valuations of ﬁrms have increasingly diverged from their
measured book value in the past decade or so.4 Part of the explanation
may be the growing use of IT and the associated investments in intangible
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0675-03 BPEA/BHY  7/22/02  1:14 PM  Page 137assets.5 Whereas early applications of computers were primarily directed
at factor substitution (particularly of low-skill clerical workers), modern
uses of computers have both enabled and necessitated substantial organi-
zational redesign and changes in the skill mix of employees.6 Collec-
tively, this research argues for a complementarity between computer
investment and organizational investment, and speciﬁcally a relationship
between use of IT and increased demand for skilled workers, greater
decentralization of certain decision rights, and team-oriented production.
Moreover, case studies and a growing body of statistical analyses suggest
that these complementary investments are large.7
This paper analytically explores the hypothesis that new, intangible
organizational assets complement IT capital just as new production
processes and factory redesign complemented the adoption of electric
motors over 100 years ago.8 To realize the potential beneﬁts of computer-
ization, investments in additional “assets” such as new organizational
processes and structures, worker knowledge, and redesigned monitoring,
reporting, and incentive systems may be needed. We study how the ﬁnan-
cial markets can be used to help identify such assets. 
In some cases the costs of implementing the new processes, training,
and incentive systems may be many times greater than the costs of the
computer technology itself. However, the managers who decide to incur
these costs presumably expect the present value of the resulting beneﬁts
to be no less than these costs, even if they accrue over a period of years
and are uncertain. In this sense managers’ behavior reﬂects their belief
that they are investing in an economic asset.
Assets that are intangible need not be invisible. On the contrary, the
presence of intangible organizational assets can be observed in at least
three ways. First, some of the speciﬁc changes that ﬁrms make may be
directly observable. In particular, previous work has used survey methods
to document a relationship between technology and some aspects of orga-
nizational change, such as new business processes, greater demand for
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times try to highlight their investments in these areas, offering tours to
customers, investors, and researchers who express an interest in them. A
visit to the manufacturing operations of Dell Computer or of a steel mini-
mill provides some insight into the effort these ﬁrms put into creating
various kinds of organizational assets and the resulting productivity
implications. Recently, researchers have begun more systematic efforts to
help quantify the extent to which companies have adopted various organi-
zational practices.10
Second, the effect of these changes on a ﬁrm’s market valuation should
be measurable. If these new practices really represent the types of organi-
zational assets we described earlier, one would expect the accumulation
of these assets to be reﬂected in ﬁrms’ market value, as revealed by
voluntary transactions among buyers and sellers of the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial
securities.
Third, these assets should provide real returns in the form of higher
output. Thus a production function framework should reveal that ﬁrms
that have put in place more of these intangibles saw greater output in sub-
sequent years, after accounting for standard inputs (such as capital, labor,
and materials).
Although we will examine all three of these indicators, our focus will
be on the relationship between intangibles and the ﬁnancial markets. Just
as investors can visit various factories and buildings owned by a ﬁrm and
attempt to judge their proﬁt-making potential, they can also form their
own judgments about the existence, relevance, and value of various intan-
gible assets owned or controlled by the ﬁrm. One difference, however, is
that ﬁrms do not report a value for many of the intangible assets on their
balance sheets, forcing investors to rely on other sources of information to
value these assets. As a result, investors and analysts appear to devote rel-
atively more time and effort to assessing the value of companies with
larger stocks of intangible assets.11
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capital markets do have some advantages for researchers in this area.
Whereas the effects on productivity or other measures of economic output
may be spread over many years, the ﬁnancial markets, which seek to
assess the discounted value of companies’ future revenues, provide an
immediate indicator of whether these investments are expected to gener-
ate value for a ﬁrm’s owners. In particular, the market value of a ﬁrm that
has leveraged computer assets with organizational investments should be
substantially greater than that of a similar ﬁrm that has not. A computer
that is integrated with complementary organizational assets should be sig-
niﬁcantly more valuable to a business than a computer in a box on the
loading dock. 
An important characteristic of the organizational capital created by
corporations is that its value may not be realized for years, if at all. Firms
choose to invest in certain business models, organizational practices, and
corporate culture. Later some of these investments turn out to be more
productive and proﬁtable than others. The ﬁnancial markets recognize
and reward those models that are well suited to the current technological
and business environment. At that point, other ﬁrms may try to imitate the
winners’ best practices, but the complexity due to explicit and implicit
complementarities among each collection of practices makes this difﬁ-
cult. Kmart may wish it could emulate Wal-Mart, and Compaq may try to
learn from Dell, but their adjustment costs may prevent this from happen-
ing for years, even if they succeed in the end. 
Thus it would be unwise to interpret high market values on an input
such as IT as reflecting high adjustment costs for the successful
investors. On the contrary, the market is mainly valuing the intangible
assets correlated with IT; if anything, IT-intensive firms are likely to
have lower adjustment costs than their rivals and hence higher levels of
IT investment. At the same time, the higher investment costs of the rival
firms are what prevents them from quickly dissipating the rents of the
winners. When complex combinations of technology and organization
are called for, the costs of imitation and investment are likely to be espe-
cially high. Furthermore, looking at the valuations of winning organiza-
tional strategies ex post can give a misleading impression of their
returns. Many, perhaps most, efforts at organizational change fail, and
projects involving extensive investments in IT often fall well short of
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risk of failure before deciding whether a project is likely to deliver the
required returns.
This has implications for how one should interpret the coefﬁcients on
asset variables in a market value equation. In the traditional interpreta-
tion,13 when a high market value is found to be associated with IT, it
reﬂects the adjustment costs of investing more in IT—the shadow value
of installed IT capital. In our interpretation, however, relatively little of
the market value is due to this effect. Most of the value springs from
intangible assets, including factors such as business organization, that are
disproportionately high in IT-intensive ﬁrms. At the end of our sample
period, it was easy to see that Dell’s business organization was a winning
model; at the beginning of the period, as that organization was being cre-
ated, its value was much less obvious.
This argument leads to ﬁve hypotheses, which are empirically testable: 
—Each dollar of installed computer capital should be correlated with
more than one dollar of market value, after controlling for other measured
assets. 
—Investments in computers should be correlated with increased
investments in certain observable organizational practices. 
—If these practices represent part of the productive assets of a ﬁrm,
they should also be associated with increases in market value. 
—If intangible assets are most common in ﬁrms that combine these
speciﬁc organizational practices with investments in computer capital,
those ﬁrms should have a higher market value than those that adopt these
same practices in isolation.
—Any intangible assets correlated with computerization and these spe-
ciﬁc organizational practices should also result in higher measured output
in future years, reﬂecting the returns to these intangible assets.
Using data on 1,216 large ﬁrms over eleven years (1987–97), we ﬁnd
evidence supporting all ﬁve hypotheses:
—Each dollar invested in computers is associated with an increase in
ﬁrm market valuation of over $10 (depending on the assumptions of the
estimation models), compared with an increase of just over $1 per dollar
of investment in other tangible assets. 
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practices that involve a speciﬁc cluster of organizational characteristics,
including greater use of teams, broader distribution of certain decision
rights, and increased worker training. 
—This cluster of organizational characteristics increases a ﬁrm’s mar-
ket valuation beyond what can be accounted for by tangible assets. 
—Firms that have adopted both these organizational characteristics
and have a large computer capital stock have disproportionately higher
market valuations. 
—Firms with higher levels of computerization, especially when they
also have higher levels of these organizational characteristics, have sig-
niﬁcantly higher output in subsequent years.
The primary alternative hypothesis for the high market-to-book ratio of
many ﬁrms is some sort of investor mispricing, perhaps due to a market
bubble, fads, or irrationality. Our argument is not that investors never
make mistakes in pricing assets; undoubtedly this does happen. However,
the ﬁve ﬁndings above are collectively difﬁcult to explain as being due
entirely to mispricing.
Furthermore, our examination of ﬁxed-effect speciﬁcations and of
speciﬁcations using differences over long periods suggests that our results
are not driven by other types of unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity or short-
run correlated shocks between market value and computer investment.
Similarly, the evidence suggests that they are not driven by a general
complementarity between capital and skill: these results appear to be
unique to IT capital and are not important for ordinary capital. Because
our sample consists predominantly of large, established ﬁrms rather than
new high-technology entrants, and because the time period of our data
predates the large increase in the value of technology stocks in the late
1990s, our results are not driven by the possible presence of a bubble in
high-technology stocks in the late 1990s. Moreover, our results are quali-
tatively similar for each individual year when estimated separately over
our eleven-year sample period, which includes the peak and trough of a
business cycle. This argues against the possibility that our results are sim-
ply driven by short-term stock market ﬂuctuations. The results are consis-
tent with earlier case-based research as well as with recent econometric
work using production functions, which suggests an important role for IT-
enabled organizational changes in increasing productivity and the value
of ﬁrms. Taken together, these results lend quantitative support to the idea
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organizational design. 
Related Literature and Cases
We begin by summarizing some of the related literature, including
some case examples that help provide some perspective and texture to the
statistical results reported in that literature and later in this paper.
IT and Organization
This paper draws primarily on two strands of research and seeks to link
them. Here we review some studies of the interaction of IT and ﬁrm orga-
nization; later, when we develop the model, we will draw on studies that
use ﬁnancial markets to provide insight into the size and nature of intan-
gible assets. 
For U.S. businesses the most important technological change in the last
twenty years has been the increased power and ubiquity of computers and
related technologies. The quality-adjusted price of logic and memory
chips has declined by about an order of magnitude every ﬁve years, and
that of many other components such as magnetic storage and data com-
munications has declined at a comparable or faster rate; these trends show
no signs of abating in the near future. Indeed, there is some evidence of an
acceleration since 1995. 
IT has effects on the organization that adopts it that are disproportion-
ate to its share of the organization’s costs. A ﬁrm’s business processes,
internal organization, and relationships with outside parties are signiﬁ-
cantly determined by the economics of information and communica-
tions.14 For instance, lower-cost access to data and communications can
exacerbate the information processing bottleneck at the tops of hierar-
chies and therefore increase the value of delegation and of decentralized,
nonmachine decisionmaking.15 It can also have direct and indirect effects
on the value of skilled labor, job design, and incentive systems. In partic-
ular, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt analyze data on IT, organizational
practices, and productivity from over 300 large ﬁrms and conclude that
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decentralized decisionmaking and greater use of teams. Increases in ﬁrms’ IT
capital stock are associated with the greatest increases in output in ﬁrms that
also have high levels of human capital or decentralized work organization, or
both. However, ﬁrms that implement only one complement without the others
are often less productive than ﬁrms which implement none at all.16
In other words, there is evidence of a complementarity between the use
of IT and certain changes in work organization. Of course, the falling
quality-adjusted price of IT raises the return to investments not only in IT
but also in its complements. A signiﬁcant literature, mostly outside of
economics, has explored various aspects of the interaction between IT
and organization, business processes, and even corporate culture.17
Although the organizational complements are valuable and, in some
cases, even essential to the success of IT innovations, implementing orga-
nizational changes is costly and risky, yielding both successes and fail-
ures.18 Both the case evidence and the econometric results suggest that the
costs of these organizational complements to IT investments typically
exceed the direct ﬁnancial costs of the IT investments themselves.19
Importantly, although many of these organizational practices may be
readily visible to competitors and are copiously documented in articles by
business school professors and consultants, they are notoriously difﬁcult
to imitate successfully.20 This reﬂects complementarities and large effects
of seemingly minor characteristics. Intel, for example, has adopted a
“copy exactly” philosophy for any chip fabrication plant built after the
ﬁrst plant in each generation. Wholesale replication of even seemingly
insigniﬁcant details has proved more reliable than trying to understand
which characteristics really matter. Going from the plant level to the ﬁrm
level only complicates the imitator’s task.
The difﬁculty in implementing organizational complements can
explain the apparent quasi-rents earned by ﬁrms that have been fortunate
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when measured in a production function framework, may show up as
higher coefﬁcients on other inputs to production. For instance, Brynjolfs-
son and Hitt and Frank Lichtenberg,21 among others, ﬁnd that heavy use
of IT is correlated with signiﬁcantly higher levels and growth rates of
measured productivity. These rents may arise because nonadopters have
not tried, or have tried and failed, to implement complementary work-
place or product innovations. Brynjolfsson and Hitt interpret their produc-
tivity results as pointing to the existence of large but unmeasured inputs to
production that are correlated with measured IT. A related literature ﬁnds
that certain work practices and human resource policies are correlated
with higher levels of productivity and thus constitute another typically
unmeasured “input” to production.22
Because effective work organization can be costly to develop and
implement but yields a stream of cash ﬂows over time, it is natural to
think of it as a kind of asset. This asset has variously been called “organi-
zational capital,” “e-capital,” and “structural capital,” depending on the
context.23
Case Studies
Although statistical data are very useful for hypothesis testing, our own
understanding of the role of organizational capital has been shaped in an
important way through visits and interviews with managers who have
implemented information systems projects and by teaching case studies
on such projects.24 Some common themes in these cases are the following:
—Computers and software are just the tip of a much larger iceberg of
implementation costs. Successful projects require enormous management
attention, worker training, and changes in seemingly unrelated areas of
the business and perhaps the entire industry. Successful chief information
ofﬁcers are now expected to combine knowledge of technology with an
understanding of the ﬁrm’s business opportunities and challenges. 
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level of the business culture and work content of individual workers, not
just in sweeping visions on the part of the chief executive ofﬁcer or the
chief information ofﬁcer. As a result, organizational capital is quasi-ﬁxed
in the short run.
—Information technology initiatives are difﬁcult and often fail. By the
same token, one of the reasons they can provide competitive advantage
and quasi-rents is that they are not trivial for other ﬁrms to duplicate.
Wal-Mart, with a recent market capitalization of $273 billion and net
tangible assets of $25.5 billion, is an example.25 Wal-Mart has spent over
$4 billion on its “retail link” supply chain system, and it has been called
“by far the commercial world’s most inﬂuential purchaser and imple-
menter of software and systems.”26 A recent McKinsey Global Institute
report singles out Wal-Mart for playing a disproportionate role in the pro-
ductivity revival in the 1990s: 
Productivity growth accelerated after 1995 because Wal-Mart’s success forced
competitors to improve their operations. . . . By the mid-1990s, [Wal-Mart’s]
productivity advantage widened to 48%. Competitors reacted by adopting
many of Wal-Mart’s innovations, including . . . economies of scale in ware-
house logistics and purchasing, electronic data interchange and wireless bar
code scanning.27
A key point in that report is that “[IT] was often a necessary but not
sufﬁcient enabler of productivity gains. Business process changes were
also necessary. . . .”28 Or, as Robert Solow puts it, “The technology that
went into what Wal-Mart did was not brand new and not especially at the
technology frontiers, but when it was combined with the ﬁrm’s manager-
ial and organizational innovations, the impact was huge.” Solow con-
cludes, “we don’t look enough at organizational innovation.”29
Other highly visible, computer-enabled business changes happen on
factory ﬂoors and in back ofﬁces. For instance, Dell combined new mate-
rials management software with a set of redesigned workﬂows to roughly
halve the ﬂoor space required in its main server assembly plant, while
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27. McKinsey Global Institute (2001, p. 2).
28. McKinsey Global Institute (2001, p. 4).
29. Martin Schrage, “Wal-Mart Trumps Moore’s Law,” Technology Review, March
2002, p. 21.
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Had Dell instead built a second factory on the site, the additional real
estate and capacity would have been duly recorded on its balance sheet. In
contrast, the processes that doubled the effective size of its existing facil-
ity went unrecorded.
Similarly, a Johnson & Johnson factory producing adhesive bandages
dramatically increased the variety of products it could manufacture and
reduced costs after combining new, computer-based ﬂexible machinery
with nearly a dozen carefully deﬁned work practices and principles,
including changes in the allocation of certain decision rights, incentive
systems, and job responsibilities.30 The right combination of work prac-
tices was discovered only after a lengthy and costly period of experimen-
tation and false starts. When a system found to be highly effective was
ultimately implemented, management ordered the factory windows
painted black to prevent competitors from quickly learning the details of
its implementation. 
Other ﬁrms are more eager to disseminate their discoveries about orga-
nizational complements to IT. For instance, Cisco Systems has identiﬁed
a set of practices and attitudes that the company associates with increased
productivity from the use of the Internet; it calls these practices and atti-
tudes its “Internet Culture.” The ﬁrm has established a culture that pro-
duces the results it is looking for, and it invests heavily in maintaining
that culture. Cisco not only has a “Director of Internet Culture” but also
issues plastic cards, which employees are asked to carry with them, that
summarize the eleven key components of that culture.31 Furthermore, as a
leading provider of some of the basic hardware of the Internet, Cisco
encourages other ﬁrms to understand and adopt these practices, which
they believe make investments in Internet technologies more productive.
Accounting for Intangible Assets
In each of these cases, the basic technology was available to all interested
parties. However, the truly valuable assets were the complementary business
processes, work practices, and even culture, all of which were harder to iden-
tify and implement. In effect, these constituted an organizational asset with
real value, although one not reﬂected on the ﬁrm’s balance sheet.
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Even many of the direct project costs of an IT project may elude docu-
mentation on a ﬁrm’s balance sheet. For example, less than 20 percent of
the typical $20 million installation cost of a SAP R/3 system (a widely
used large-scale package designed to integrate different organizational
processes) is for hardware and software, which is capitalized; by far the
greater part of the investment is for hiring consultants to help develop
requirements; evaluate, select, and customize the software; redesign orga-
nizational processes; and train the staff in the use of the new system.32
According to the American Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants,
although the costs of software purchase and development should be capi-
talized if they exceed some threshold,33 most of these other project costs
must be expensed.34 As ﬁrms devote more resources to various IT proj-
ects, this accounting policy drives a wedge between the market value of a
ﬁrm’s assets and their value on its balance sheet.35 As noted by Lev and
Paul Zarowin: 
restructuring costs, such as for employee training, production reengineering or
organizational redesign, are immediately expensed, while the beneﬁts of
restructuring in the form of lower production costs and improved customer ser-
vice, are recognized in later periods. Consequently, during restructuring, the
ﬁnancial statements reﬂect the cost of restructuring but not its beneﬁts, and are
therefore largely disconnected from market values which reﬂect the expected
beneﬁts along with the costs.36
The accounting policy of excluding many such intangible assets from a
ﬁrm’s balance sheet should not be taken as an implication that they have
32. Gormley and others (1998).
33. AICPA Statement of Position 98-1. This does not apply for “small” software pur-
chases or development projects. Firms have some discretion as to the exact threshold: at
FleetBoston Financial, for example, software development projects smaller than $500,000
are normally entirely expensed, according to Cherie Arruda, technology controller at Fleet-
Boston (personal communication with the authors, March 22, 2002).
34. Speciﬁcally, “Examples of the kind of work that must be expensed include: Alter-
natives development and evaluation, development of requirements, training, data conver-
sion, evaluation of technology, and choosing one of the alternatives being proposed”
(Colenso, 2000, p. 3).
35. Before the adoption of Statement of Position 98-1, ﬁrms typically expensed even more
of their internal software development costs. See, for example, the notes to the consolidated
ﬁnancial statements in Lucent Technologies’ 2001 annual report (www.lucent.com/investor/
annual/01/pdf/notes.pdf). The exception is ﬁrms that produced software for sale, which
began more aggressive capitalization in 1985 as a result of FASB Statement 86.
36. Lev and Zarowin (1999, p. 20).
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unknowable. On the contrary, it partly reﬂects the different goals of
accountants and economists. No single number is a correct reﬂection of
the value of an asset in all states of the world. A creditor, when evaluating
a piece of collateral, might care most about that asset’s value in those
states of the world where the debtor is unable or unwilling to make inter-
est payments. In those circumstances collateral may need to be seized and
sold for salvage value, and then the value of many intangible assets, such
as organizational capital, is likely to be very low or zero. Accountants, to
the extent they are responsible for providing useful information to credi-
tors and potential creditors, might reasonably adopt a conservative valua-
tion for many assets, particular those that have little or no salvage value in
“bad” states of the world. Furthermore, a ﬁnancial accountant needs to
provide, for outside parties, reliable numbers that are not easily subject to
“earnings management” or other types of gaming by management, since
the interests of management and creditors or potential creditors are not
always aligned. According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board,
more conservative rules for recognizing assets are called for when valua-
tions are uncertain.37
Equity investors care less than other creditors about the value of assets
in “bad” states of the world, and more about the expected cash ﬂows those
assets can generate across all states of the world. This is one reason that,
when assets have different values in different states of the world, there
may be a large, and perfectly sensible, gap between balance sheet assets
and the market value of a ﬁrm. To the extent that an economist is inter-
ested in the expected value of a ﬁrm’s assets, their market value as judged
by equity investors may provide a more accurate guide than the balance
sheet. In this paper we attempt to make use of these judgments.
Econometric Model and Data
Here we sketch the derivation of our stock market valuation model and
describe the data used in the analysis.
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Our model draws on standard ﬁnance theory and assumes that man-
agers are rational in their investment decisions and that investors are
rational when they make their judgments about the valuation of corporate
securities. Of course, this does not mean that their decisions will always
be correct ex post; uncertainty and imperfect information make that
unlikely. In addition, bubbles and other anomalies in the valuation of
ﬁnancial assets can make the interpretation of the econometric results
more difﬁcult. We address these possibilities in a variety of ways. 
The basic structure of the model follows the literature on the valuation
of capital goods that relates the market value of a ﬁrm to the capital goods
it owns.38 Others have taken variations of this framework adapted for
empirical use and applied them to the valuation of ﬁrms’ R&D,39 and the
relationship between ﬁrm diversiﬁcation and ﬁrm value, using ﬁrm-level
data.40
The empirical use of Tobin’s q to capture intangible organizational
assets has been proposed by other authors and has been signiﬁcantly
advanced recently by Robert Hall, who states, “Firms produce productive
capital by combining plant, equipment, new ideas and organization,” and
concludes, “The data suggest that U.S. corporations own substantial
amounts of intangible capital not recorded in the sector’s books or any-
where in government statistics.”41 Elsewhere Hall discusses the analogy
between a flow of investment in reorganization and a ﬂow of investment
in physical capital.42 Whereas he uses the label “e-capital” to describe all
intangible assets revealed by the gap between the ﬁnancial markets’ value
of ﬁrms and the value of their replacement assets in the 1990s, this paper
seeks to identify more explicitly the role of computer capital and particu-
lar organizational practices.43 Thus our paper is most closely related to
that of Brynjolfsson and Yang,44 who found evidence of high q values for
IT but did not explicitly link them to organizational investments. 
150 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
38. See, for example, Tobin (1969), Hayashi (1982), Naik (1994), Yang (1994), Bond
and Cummins (2000), and R. Hall (2000a, 2001a, 2001b).
39. Griliches (1981); Griliches and Cockburn (1988); B. Hall (1993a, 1993b, 1999).
40. Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988).
41. R. Hall (2001a, p. 1186).
42. R. Hall (2000a).
43. Interestingly, in related work using similar data on computers and organizational
investments but a different framework, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2000, 2002) 
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managers make capital investments (I) in several different asset types and
expenditures in variable costs (N) with the goal of maximizing the market
value of the ﬁrm (V). In turn, V is equal to the present value of all future
cash ﬂows π(t) according to a discount function u(t). The accumulation of
capital investment, less depreciation ( ), produces a vector of the capital
stock (K, which includes different components of capital Kj, j = 1 … J,
where the js are computer capital, other physical capital, and so forth).
The capital stock, along with the variable inputs, is used to produce output
through a production function (F). This yields the following program:
Maximize with respect to I and N
where
and the following holds:
Under the assumptions that F(K,  N) is a homogeneous function of
degree 1 over K, N, and I (constant returns to scale) and is twice differen-
tiable, one can solve for the market value of the ﬁrm that results from this
optimization problem. If all assets can be documented and no adjustment
costs are incurred in making them fully productive, buying a ﬁrm is
equivalent to buying a collection of separate assets.45 Thus the market
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also ﬁnd empirical support for the second main claim of R. Hall (2000a) regarding the orga-
nizational drivers of the increased demand for college-educated workers.
44. Brynjolfsson and Yang (1999).
45. Baily (1981).
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The formulation in equation 4 suggests a basic estimating equation that
relates the market value of ﬁrm i to the assets that the ﬁrm possesses,
allowing for repeated observations over time t:
If the vector of assets K for each ﬁrm contains all relevant capital assets
and there are no other forms of speciﬁcation or measurement error or
adjustment costs, we would expect that α = 0 and νj = 1 for all j. However,
  may deviate from 1 if adjustment costs are signiﬁcant or if there are
omitted variables that are correlated with the quantity of observed capital
assets. 
In the presence of adjustment costs, the shadow value of installed
capital can exceed its acquisition costs. Capital that is installed may be
more valuable than capital that is not yet installed. For example, if there
are two types of capital, computers (Kc) and other physical capital (Kp),
then (νc – 1) would represent the difference in value between computer
capital that is fully integrated into the ﬁrm and otherwise identical com-
puters that are available on the open market, and (νp – 1) would be the cor-
responding value for other types of capital.46 As shown by Fumio
Hayashi,47  'K can be made observable when there are constant returns to
scale, because marginal and average q will be equal. In essence, the value
of the ﬁrm will simply be a function of the capital price vector ( ) and the
capital quantity vector (K) of each of the types of capital it owns. 
Similarly, the observed market value of each capital asset may also
deviate from 1 when there are other capital assets that are not measured,
such as omitted intangible assets, or shocks to market value that are cor-
related with the levels of observed capital assets. For instance, these
intangible assets might include organizational capital that is complemen-
tary to certain observed capital assets or persistent, ﬁrm-speciﬁc compo-
nents of value (such as management quality) that are correlated with
capital quantity. Market value shocks include persistent errors in stock
market valuation that are simultaneously correlated with capital assets
(for example, the stock market over- or undervaluing high-technology
() . , 5
1
VK it i j
j
J
ji t i t
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46. See, for example, Abel (1990).
47. Hayashi (1982).
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opportunities that raises stock market value and induces capital invest-
ment. These speciﬁcation errors can be represented as a systematic omit-
ted component of market valuation (Mit) in the theoretical market value
relationship:
From standard omitted-variables arguments,48 the presence of Mit in the
market valuation equation will alter the estimates of the value of capital
assets ( *, a vector) in a systematic way depending on the correlation of
the observed capital assets (K, a matrix with rows representing different
assets for each ﬁrm and columns representing different ﬁrm-year observa-
tions) with the omitted component of market value (M, a column vector
with elements Mit). Speciﬁcally, in the absence of adjustment costs,
This implies that  * is simply the vector of coefﬁcients that would arise in
a regression of the capital assets on the omitted market valuation compo-
nent (M):
Thus, in the absence of adjustment costs, a high value for a particular cap-
ital asset in the market value equation implies a correlation between that
asset and M, for instance, a large stock of (valuable) intangible assets or
investor errors in valuation that is correlated with the quantity of observed
assets. 
As noted by Stephen Bond and Jason Cummins,49 distinguishing the
exact nature of this relationship is more difficult. If we interpret M as
arising from the omission of intangible assets such as organizational cap-
ital from the equation, we can write Mit = Qit KO,it, where Qit is the market-
determined shadow price of organizational capital and KO,it the quantity
of organizational capital. In general, it is difficult without making further
assumptions to distinguish the price and the quantity of organizational
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48. Greene (1993, p. 246). 
49. Bond and Cummins (2000).
0675-03 BPEA/BHY  7/22/02  1:14 PM  Page 153capital individually,50 but for purposes of identifying the value of orga-
nizational complements to computers we need only determine the value
of Mit. However, if there is a bubble in the valuation of corporate securi-
ties (an “error” in the markets’ perception of Qit), this can alter estimates
of Mit.
Instrumental variables techniques will be of little help insofar as they
do not distinguish between true organizational complements and errors in
valuation. Removing the inﬂuence of factors that are both unobserved and
correlated with productivity would remove the very variables we seek to
measure: intangible assets. If such a technique were successful, the coef-
ﬁcients on the observed capital assets would be driven close to their theo-
retical value of 1, but no light would be shed on the magnitude of the
intangibles.
However, if data are available that allow one to measure some of the
components of Mit, it may be possible to partially distinguish the relative
contribution of market valuation errors and the relative contribution of the
intangible assets that comprise Mit. We may also be able to reduce the
impact of identiﬁable sources of correlated shocks by means of other
econometric adjustments such as control variables for time periods or
industries.
Our analysis focuses on obtaining data and measuring the contribution
of various aspects of organizational capital (KO) that, from our earlier
discussion, represent potential components of M either alone or in com-
bination with computer assets (KC). We assume that the level of KO is
difficult to change (that is, quasi-fixed) in the short run and thus can be
viewed as exogenous with respect to both computer asset levels and mar-
ket valuations.51
There are several ways in which KO can inﬂuence market valuation.
First, it can have a direct correlation with market value while being
orthogonal to all other assets. Directly incorporating measures of KO in
the regression will then improve the efﬁciency of the estimation while
having no impact on the other coefﬁcients. 
Second, KO can inﬂuence market value through its correlation with
other assets. In general, the degree of bias in the estimated components of
v depends on the correlations among all capital assets. However, if KO is
154 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
50. See R. Hall (2001b) for one approach.
51. See the related discussion in Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002).
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nents (including any components of M other than KO), from equation 7
this will reduce the coefﬁcient on KC when direct measures of organiza-
tional capital are present in the regression.52 The reduction is proportional
to the correlation between KC and KO. 
Finally, KO may inﬂuence market valuation disproportionately when KC
is also large, if there are additional, unobserved intangible assets that are
correlated with the simultaneous presence of both KC and KO. Under stan-
dard q theory, the coefﬁcient on an asset can be interpreted as a function
of the adjustment cost of increased investment in that asset. Thus the pres-
ence of arbitrage opportunities normally requires that the market value
correlated with an asset be the same regardless of what other assets are
also present. However, this need not be the case if the value of otherwise
unobserved intangible assets varies systematically with the relationship
among observed assets, yielding an additional correlation with market
value above their simultaneous direct correlation. That is, there may be a
distinct intangible asset that is correlated with the combination of KC and
KO (but not necessarily with these inputs separately). In particular, the
simultaneous presence of high values for both KC and KO may signal that
a ﬁrm has successfully adopted a certain work system. If that work system
is both valuable and costly to implement, even for ﬁrms that have already
adopted KC or KO alone, ﬁrms with the combination of both inputs should
be expected to have disproportionately higher market values. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the ﬁndings of the literature on IT impacts.53
Unlike the previous two relationships, which can be captured simply by
introducing  KO into the regression in levels, this relationship will be
revealed by the interaction KC × KO. 
Collectively, these relationships can be captured by including both KOand
KC × KO in the regression. In addition, we can also test the uniqueness of
this organizational relationship to computers by estimating the correla-
tions between the other components of K and KO as well as their interac-
tions in the market value equation.
The estimation of the contribution of intangible assets relies on mini-
mizing other omitted variables that are correlated with asset levels. To the
Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin M. Hitt, and Shinkyu Yang 155
52. To apply equation 7, replace K and M with their values conditional on KO.
53. See, for example, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2000) and Brynjolfsson and
Hitt (2001).
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economy (for example, changes in the price of new capital investment, or
the rate of overall economic growth) or unique to particular industries
(such as the introduction of a new production technology throughout an
industry), they can be accounted for by controls for year and industry.
If instead the omitted variables are time-invariant factors that are spe-
ciﬁc to individual ﬁrms, they can be removed by estimating difference
equations that remove the contribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects. Moreover,
differences measured over long intervals (long differences) may be robust
to a variety of other short-run shocks to the extent that asset levels and
market value have sufﬁcient time within the difference interval to return
to equilibrium levels following a shock. However, these types of tech-
niques also remove at least some of the true organizational capital that we
are looking for, to the extent that organizational practices differ across
ﬁrms and are relatively slow changing.
Finally, some omitted variables, such as R&D investment or advertis-
ing, could be indicators of other assets. To the extent this is a problem,
these variables can be directly incorporated into the estimating equation
as additional covariates.
For purposes of estimation we divide assets into three categories: com-
puters, other permanent physical assets (property, plant, and equipment,
or PP&E), and other balance sheet assets (receivables, inventories, good-
will, and other assets). We deduct current cash balances both from market
value and from other assets. We also include control variables: the ratio of
R&D capital to sales, the ratio of advertising expense to sales, dummy
variables to account for missing observations on R&D or advertising
expenditure, industry dummies (usually at the two-digit Standard Indus-
trial Classiﬁcation, or SIC, level), and year dummies.54
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54. Advertising and R&D are other types of nonstandard “assets” that have been con-
sidered in prior work. Because no capitalized value is reported for them, we simply include
them as ratios in the reported regression. This can be thought of as treating current spend-
ing on these assets as a noisy indicator of their capital stock values (B. Hall, 1993a, 1993b;
see also Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1999, for a more detailed analysis of these assets in this
context). Because R&D is available only for about half the sample, and advertising for only
about a third, we set the values of these variables to zero when they are missing and include
a dummy variable to capture the mean contribution of these variables when the data are not
available. 
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The data set used for this analysis is a panel of computer capital and
stock market valuation data for 1,216 ﬁrms over the 1987–97 period,
matched to a cross-sectional survey of organizational practices conducted
in 1995 and 1996. A brief description of each data source follows; the
appendix provides additional detail.
computer technology. The measures of computer use were derived
from the Computer Intelligence Infocorp (CII) installation database,
which details IT spending by site for Fortune 1000 companies. Data from
approximately 25,000 sites were aggregated to form the measures for the
1,000 companies that represent the total population in any given year.
This database is compiled from telephone surveys that gather detailed
information about the ownership of computer equipment and related
products. Most sites are updated at least annually, with more frequent
sampling for larger sites. The year-end state of the database for each year
from 1987 to 1997 was used for the computer measures.55 From these data
we obtained the total capital stock of computers (central processors, per-
sonal computers, and peripherals). The IT data do not include all types
of information processing or communications equipment and are likely
to miss some portion of computer equipment that is purchased by indi-
viduals or departments without the knowledge of information systems
personnel.56
organizational practices. The organizational practices data in this
analysis come from a series of surveys of large ﬁrms. These surveys
adapted questions from previous surveys on human resource practices and
workplace transformation.57 The questions address the allocation of vari-
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55. There was a change in the valuation methodology in the CII database in 1994.
Thereafter the market value of central processors was no longer calculated at the equipment
level. However, CII did continue to obtain the market value information going forward, and
thus comparable measures could be constructed by multiplying the aggregate number of
units (personal computers, mainframes, workstations, and so on) by the average value for
the category. Year-by-year regressions do not suggest the presence of any structural change
in the data.
56. Another potential source of error in this regard is the outsourcing of computer facil-
ities. Fortunately, to the extent that the computers reside on the client site, they will still be
properly counted by CII’s census. To the extent that these facilities are located at a third-
party site, they will not be properly counted.
57. Huselid (1995); Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997); Osterman (1994).
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ous types of decisionmaking authority, the use of self-managing teams,
the breadth of job responsibilities, and other miscellaneous characteristics
of the workplace (further detail appears in the results section). Organiza-
tional data were collected at the end of 1995 and early 1996, covering
most of the Fortune 1000. This yielded a cross section of 416 ﬁrms, with
a survey response rate of 49.7 percent. We detected no signiﬁcant pattern
of response bias when the sample was compared with the population of
ﬁrms in the Fortune 1000. Of the 416 ﬁrms that responded to the survey in
some way, we have complete IT, organizational, and ﬁnancial data for a
total of 272. 
market valuation and other data. Compustat data were used to
construct stock market valuation metrics and provide additional ﬁrm infor-
mation not covered by other sources. Measures were created for total mar-
ket value (market value of equity plus book value of debt), PP&E, other
assets, R&D expense, and advertising expense. For the productivity analy-
sis we also compute constant-dollar value added, labor input, and the capi-
tal stock. We removed from the sample those ﬁrms for which the data were
inconsistent from year to year, ﬁrms that principally produced computers
or software, and ﬁrms in the communications sector (SIC 4813). The last
two groups of ﬁrms were removed because the nature of computers and
telecommunications equipment as both a production input and output
makes these ﬁrms very different from the rest of the economy.58
The full data set comprises 7,564 observations over eleven years for
market value and computer capital stock, with each of 1,216 ﬁrms repre-
sented by at least one observation. After matching these data to the orga-
nizational practices surveys, we had complete organizational and market
value data for a subsample of 272 ﬁrms, for a total of 2,097 observations.
Results
We performed regression and correlation analyses to test our ﬁve
hypotheses. First, we explored the basic relationship between IT and
58. For most of the economy, computers are a complement to other production assets.
However, in the computer and software industries, computers are the principal production
asset. Moreover, because these ﬁrms often use the technology assets they produce, they
may face very different effective prices for these assets. Communications industries were
excluded because of the difﬁculty in separating out corporate computer use from telephone
switchgear, which is largely computer based.
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ses to examine the relationship between computer capital and the adop-
tion of speciﬁc organizational practices, and we constructed a single
variable, ORG, to capture a portion of the relevant variation in organiza-
tion across ﬁrms. It is this variable that will represent our (noisy) measure
of organizational capital. Third, we investigated the effect of ORG on ﬁrm
market value. Fourth, we studied how the combination of ORG and com-
puters affects market value. Finally, we examined how these variables
affect output in a production function framework. We also performed a
number of checks on the robustness of our analysis and considered alter-
native hypotheses.
Computers and Market Value
basic ﬁndings. We begin by replicating earlier work by Brynjolfsson
and Yang with our slightly larger data set.59 Table 1 reports results of
regression analyses examining the relationship between computers and
market value. This equation relates market value to the three types of
assets identiﬁed above: computers, PP&E, and other assets (principally,
accounts receivable, inventories, and liquid assets other than cash).60
Because we are pooling multiple ﬁrms in multiple years, we include
dummy variables for each year and two-digit SIC industry. With the
exception of our regressions using least absolute deviation (LAD) tech-
niques, we use Huber-White robust standard errors or random-effects
models to account for multiple observations of the same ﬁrm over time.61
We also include measures of ﬁrms’ R&D-to-sales and advertising-to-sales
ratios. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression reported in table 1 ﬁnds
that each dollar of installed PP&E is valued at about $1.47, somewhat 
larger than the theoretical value of $1 that would be expected if there were
no adjustment costs or correlated intangible assets. The market value of
Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin M. Hitt, and Shinkyu Yang 159
59. Brynjolfsson and Yang (1999).
60. An alternative speciﬁcation would include the book value of some of these other
assets in the computation of market value and remove them from the list of independent
variables. Leaving them in the regression allows us to test, rather than assume, that their
market valuation is equal to their book value.
61. The LAD regressions, being nonlinear regression procedures, do not have analo-
gous panel data corrections. Therefore the standard errors for analyses using these proce-
dures may be understated by as much as a factor of 3.3 (the square root of the number of
time-series observations), although in practice the error is well below this bound.
0675-03 BPEA/BHY  7/22/02  1:14 PM  Page 159each dollar of other assets is close to $1; apparently these assets are less
subject to adjustment costs or omitted components of market value. 
Strikingly, however, each dollar of computer capital is associated with
about $12 of market value. This apparent excess valuation of computers
suggests the presence of substantial intangible assets, adjustment costs, or
other omitted components of market value correlated with computer
assets. In these and all subsequent regressions, time and industry controls
are jointly signiﬁcant (results not shown). We are thus able to remove
some of the temporal shocks and other omitted components of market
value unique to time period and industry. Although we do not have capi-
tal stock values for R&D or for advertising, we do have the investment
ﬂows for some of the ﬁrms in our sample, and we include their input
shares as controls; these are also signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations (not
shown).
Table 1 also reports estimates of the same equation using an LAD
regression technique, which minimizes the sum of absolute values of the
residuals rather than the sum of the squared residuals as in an OLS regres-
sion. This technique not only minimizes the inﬂuence of outliers but also
reduces the impact of heterogeneity in ﬁrm size in our sample. This
approach produces a similar estimate for the coefﬁcient on computer cap-
ital (now 11.88), which is still far greater than the theoretical baseline of
$1. The coefﬁcient on PP&E falls slightly (to 1.18), whereas the coefﬁ-
cient on other assets is essentially the same. 
long-difference speciﬁcations. Our earlier discussion suggests
that certain types of organizational practices are likely to have a signiﬁ-
160 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
Table 1. Regressions of Market Value on Asset Quantities, 1987–97a
Estimation method
Independent variable OLS LAD




Other assetsb 1.064 1.039
(0.012) (0.001)
R2 0.950 n.a.
Source: Authors’ regressions. See appendix for description of data sources.
a. The dependent variable is ﬁrms’ market value. The sample contains 7,564 observations from 1,216 ﬁrms. All regressions
control for year, the ratio of R&D to sales, the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales, and SIC industry; the OLS regression
includes two-digit controls, while the LAD regression includes 1
1⁄2-digit controls. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; for
the OLS regression they are Huber-White robust standard errors.
b. Includes accounts receivable, inventories, and noncash liquid assets.
0675-03 BPEA/BHY  7/22/02  1:14 PM  Page 160cant inﬂuence on the value of computer assets. One way to account for
these practices without measuring them directly is by estimating a differ-
ence speciﬁcation that eliminates the contribution of any time-invariant,
ﬁrm-speciﬁc component of market value. To the extent that organiza-
tional assets can be viewed as quasi-ﬁxed, at least over moderately long
periods, this suggests that we may be able to examine the amount of com-
puter value potentially attributable to these types of factors. Table 2
reports estimates of our basic speciﬁcation (including year and industry
dummy variables) in differences ranging from those at one year to those
at ten years.
Although any of these differences would presumably remove all time-
invariant, ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, these alternative speciﬁcations
may yield different results for at least two reasons. First, longer differ-
ences are much less subject to bias from measurement error in the inde-
pendent variables.62 Thus, if measurement error were the only concern,
we would expect the longest differences to produce estimates closest to
the “true” coefﬁcient values. Second, longer differences allow for more
time for market values or asset quantities affected by short-run shocks to
return to equilibrium values. Thus, varying difference lengths may enable
comparisons of short-run and long-run relationships.63
The first several columns of table 2 suggest that, in equations using
short (one- and two-year) differences, changes in computer asset levels
appear to have no significant correlation with changes in market value,
whereas in equations with longer differences the relationship is substan-
tial. The coefficients rise from essentially zero for one-year differences
to around 10 for five-year differences, and stabilize beyond that. The
point estimate for the longest difference possible in the sample (ten
years) is considerably higher, but because of the small sample size it is
very imprecisely estimated and not statistically different from the other
long-difference coefficients.
These results have several interpretations. First, they suggest that
there may be considerable measurement error in the estimates of com-
puter assets, biasing downward the short-difference more than the long-
difference coefficients. This explanation also implies that the “true”
estimate of the computer coefﬁcient is more closely approximated by the
Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin M. Hitt, and Shinkyu Yang 161
62. Griliches and Hausman (1986).
63. See, for example, Bartelsman, Caballero, and Lyons (1994) or Brynjolfsson and
Hitt (2001) for further discussion.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0675-03 BPEA/BHY  7/22/02  1:14 PM  Page 162longer-difference estimates, which are all considerably above 1. Second,
the results may suggest that it may take several years of adjustment for
computer assets to become valuable; this would be consistent with the
nature of the complementary organizational changes discussed earlier.
These results also provide some evidence against many types of corre-
lated shocks, such as a new invention that immediately raises market
value and requires additional investment in computer equipment for new
production facilities. Presumably these types of shocks would act on a
much shorter time scale, such as one year. These regressions also elimi-
nate the bias due to omitted variables that are time invariant. However,
these results do rule out the possibility that the computer estimates are
affected by gradual adjustment over long time periods to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shocks.
year-by-year analysis. Another way to examine the robustness of
the results is to examine year-by-year cross sections of the results. If the
results are biased upward by short-run shocks, some years will have dis-
proportionately high values while others will be close to their equilibrium
value. Table 3 presents regressions for each of the eleven individual years
in our sample. Although there is some year-to-year variation in the com-
puter asset coefﬁcients, there is no particular time trend, and none of the
estimates are statistically different from the estimate based on the pooled
data of approximately 12. Although this does not rule out the possibility
of considerable changes outside the 1987–97 time period or our sample of
ﬁrms, it does show that, for our sample, computer asset values consis-
tently show coefﬁcient values of 9 or greater.64
Basic Findings Regarding the Role of Organizational Structure
Here we report correlations found between computer asset values and
various measures of internal organization.65 All correlations are Spearman
rank-order correlations between various measures of computers and the
organizational variables, controlling for ﬁrm size (employment), produc-
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64. Nothing in the theory requires the installed price of computer capital to be invariant
as technology evolves and investor expectations change, any more than the value of an oil
company’s proven reserves need be invariant.
65. These results build on earlier work reported in Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1997) and
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002).
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tion worker occupation, and industry.66 We used three different measures
of a ﬁrm’s IT: the total value of the IT installed base, total central pro-
cessing power (in millions of instructions per second),67 and the total
number of personal computers. We used multiple measures because they
capture slightly different aspects of computerization (for example, central
processing power measures centralized computing assets, whereas the
number of personal computers measures decentralized computing assets).
Table 4 presents correlations between each of these different measures
of IT and four dimensions of organizational design: structural decentral-
ization, individual decentralization, team incentives, and skill acquisition.
Previous theoretical and empirical work has linked these types of prac-
tices to IT investment.68 Consistent with our argument that IT and organi-
zational practices are complementary, we conﬁrm that, across multiple
measures of IT and multiple measures of organization, ﬁrms that use more
IT differ statistically from other ﬁrms: they tend to use more teams, have
broader job responsibilities, and allocate greater authority to their work-
ers, even after controlling for ﬁrm size and industry. These are only broad
averages and do not apply to all ﬁrms in all circumstances: many success-
ful IT users do not implement all or even any of these practices. In partic-
ular, computers have helped centralize a large subset of decisions
involving aggregate data analysis (analyzing bar code data, for example),
even as they have facilitated the decentralization of many decisions that
require on-the-spot information, human relations, exception processing,
and nonroutine inference. 
In addition to being correlated with IT, these practices are all corre-
lated with each other. Following Brynjolfsson and Hitt,69 we constructed a
composite variable (ORG) as the standardized (mean 0, variance 1) sum
of the standardized individual work practice variables. This allowed us to
capture, in a single construct, an organization’s overall tendency to use
66. Results are similar when probit or ordered probit regression techniques are used.
We report Spearman rank-order correlations because they are easier to interpret given the
nonmetric nature of most of our work system variables. Included in the regressions are sep-
arate controls for 1
1⁄2-digit SIC industries (see the appendix for details).
67. Not including the processing power of personal computers.
68. See Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), Bresnahan (1997), and Hitt and
Brynjolfsson (1997). A survey of related work appears in Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000).
69. Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1997).
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this collection of work practices, which we could then use for further
analysis. A principal components analysis (reported in table 5) showed
that all components of this variable have high loadings on a single factor
(which explains approximately 35 percent of the variance of these mea-
sures), and a scree plot (not shown) suggests that this is the only nonnoise
factor. We interpret ORG as potentially capturing some aspects of the rel-
evant organizational capital, KO,as described above. We have no expecta-
tion that our simple measures will capture more than a small portion of
such capital, but rather see it as an early attempt to demonstrate the exis-
Table 4. Correlations between Organizational Structure and Alternative IT
Measuresa
Measure of IT investment
Total central   No. of 
Installed processing personal 
Measure of organizational structure IT base power computers
Structural decentralizationb
Degree of team self-management 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.20***
Employee involvement groups 0.07 0.08 0.08
Diversity of job responsibilities 0.07 0.12** 0.10*
Individual decentralizationb
Who determines pace of work 0.04 0.06 0.02
Who determines method of work 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.15***
Degree of individual control 0.11* 0.15** 0.15**
Team incentivesc
Degree of team building 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.18***
Workers promoted for teamwork 0.02 0.10* 0.00
Skill acquisition
Percent of workers that receive 
off-the-job training 0.14** 0.15*** 0.14**
Degree of screening prospective 
hires for educationd 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.21***
ORG composite variable 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.25***
Source: Authors’ calculations. See appendix for description of data sources.
a. Table reports Spearman partial rank-order correlations, controlling for ﬁrm size, worker occupation, and 1
1⁄2-digit SIC
industry. Sample size varies from 300 to 372, depending on data availability. * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level, **
at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1 percent level.
b. Scale of 1 to 5, where 5 represents greatest decentralization (most extensive use of self-managing teams or employee
involvement groups, greatest diversity of job responsibilities, greatest worker control of pace or method of work, or greatest
degree of individual control).
c. Scale of 1 to 5, where 5 represents greatest use of team incentives (projects requiring team efforts, or promotion of workers
for teamwork).
d. Scale of 1 to 5, where 5 indicates most extensive use of screening.
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tence and economic relevance of work practices in this kind of frame-
work.
The composite variable ORG is highly correlated with computeriza-
tion, consistent with our earlier discussion. In what follows we will
explore the inﬂuence that this cluster of practices has on both the market
value of the ﬁrm and the market value of computer capital.
Our earlier arguments suggested that these types of organizational
practices should be strongly related to computer assets, but they are pre-
sumably less related to traditional physical capital (PP&E) or other assets.
One way to investigate this relationship is to examine a simple condi-
tional correlation equation that relates the logarithm of asset quantity to
the price of the asset (proxied by time dummy variables), ﬁrm size (prox-
ied by the logarithm of employment), and ORG. We also include controls
for two-digit SIC industry to control for sample heterogeneity. 
Table 6 shows the results of this analysis for the three types of assets
we consider. ORG is correlated with greater use of computer assets (ﬁrst
column): ﬁrms with a value for ORG 1 standard deviation above the mean
have 18 percent more computer assets on average (this result is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level). However, PP&E and other assets
have no signiﬁcant relationship with ORG (second and third columns). In
addition to conﬁrming our hypothesized relationship between computers
Table 5. Unrotated Principal Components Used to Construct the ORG Variablea
Loading on ﬁrst   Loading on second 
principal principal 
Work practices component component
Degree of team self-management 0.751 0.006
Employee involvement groups 0.707 0.176
Who determines pace of work 0.528 –0.628
Who determines method of work 0.572 –0.456
Degree of team building 0.747 0.250
Workers promoted for teamwork 0.401 0.367
Percent of workers who receive 
off-the-job training 0.425 0.408
Degree of screening prospective 
hires for education 0.466 –0.095
Memorandum: percent of 
variance explained 34.8 12.6
Source: Authors’ calculations. See appendix for description of data sources.
a. See table 4 for deﬁnitions and scale measures.
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and ORG, this suggests that we can treat the other capital components as
essentially orthogonal to ORG; thus any omitted-variables bias that is
related to ORG is likely to affect the measured value of computer assets,
but not that of the other assets. The correlation between IT and ORG
implies that ﬁrms with high levels of ORG either receive greater beneﬁts
from investments in IT, or have lower costs of adoption, or both.
The Relationship between Organizational Structure and Market Value
organization variable in the market value equation. Here we
extend our basic estimating equation to include ORG and its interaction
with computer assets, using various regression techniques. Regression
equation 7-1 in table 7 is the baseline OLS regression (comparable to the
ﬁrst column of table 1) for market value for the subsample of 272 ﬁrms
for which we have data for the ORG variable. These results are similar to
our earlier baseline results from the full sample. Next we introduce the
ORG variable into the regression in several ways. Because the ORG vari-
able is an index (with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1), it must be appro-
priately scaled to be comparable to the other inputs. As ORG is essentially
a concept relating to the organization of labor (education levels, training
costs, allocation of certain decision rights to employees), it is natural to
scale ORG by employment in considering its direct contribution to market
value. The results of including the scaled ORG term in the regression are
shown in column 7-2. Note that the coefﬁcient on computer assets drops
from 14.6 to 11.5 (approximately 20 percent), suggesting that at least
some of the high observed value of computers is a result of computers
Table 6. OLS Regressions of Computer Assets, PP&E, and Other Assets 
on Organizational Assets, 1987–97a
Dependent variable
Independent variable Computer assets PP&E Other assets
ORG 0.179*** 0.033 0.009
(0.055) (0.050) (0.048)
Employment 0.736*** 0.801*** 0.800***
(0.102) (0.091) (0.084)
R2 0.470 0.817 0.803
Source: Authors’ regressions. See appendix for description of data sources.
a. All variables except ORG are expressed in natural logarithms. The sample contains 2,444 observations. All regressions
include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indi-
cates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
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serving as a proxy for organizational assets, as would be expected from
our earlier discussion on omitted variables.
Of course, the simple measures that constitute ORG represent only a
small fraction of the putative organizational capital of a typical ﬁrm. Fur-
thermore, there are undoubtedly circumstances in which these particular
practices are not beneﬁcial. Nonetheless, we do ﬁnd some evidence that
investors, on average, may be treating the organizational practices that we
measure much like more tangible types of capital by recognizing their
contribution to the market value of a ﬁrm. All else equal, ﬁrms that are
endowed with workers with greater education and training, and that have
developed systems that support more decentralization of certain decision
rights, appear to be valued at a slight premium to their industry peers.
This relationship accounts for at least a part of the “excess” valuation of
computers. 
interaction between organization and other assets. We next
consider how ORG relates to the value of computer assets by including
terms interacting ORG and each of the three capital components: com-
puter assets, PP&E, and other assets. In computing these and other inter-
actions that include terms already in the regression, we center both
variables so that the existing linear terms in the regression have the same
interpretation.70 The results are shown using OLS regression (column 7-3)
and alternative speciﬁcations (columns 7-5, 7-6, and 7-7). 
First, we ﬁnd that when the interaction term is included in the regres-
sion, the coefﬁcient on IT drops substantially. In the OLS regression (col-
umn 7-3), the coefﬁcient on IT drops by roughly 50 percent compared with
the regression that includes only the scaled ORG term (column 7-2) and is
only 40 percent of the original value in the baseline regression (column
7-1). A similar, perhaps slightly larger difference for the IT coefﬁcient is
found when we use a generalized least squares random effects model,
which also yields slightly more precise estimates for the interaction terms
70. If the variables are not centered, the interpretation of the direct coefﬁcients is
changed. Consider a hypothetical regression equation V = γOO + γII + ε (model A) com-
pared with another equation representing the “true” model of the underlying relationship
V = γ' OO + γ' II + γ' OI (O × I) + ε' (model B). When the interaction term is not centered, γI = γ' I
+ O  γ' OI, where O   is the mean of O. Centering the interaction term removes the O  γ' OI term
and thus preserves the interpretation of γI as the contribution of the linear term. However, in
the centered regression it is possible that the linear term changes if the true underlying data
relationship is not precisely the linear interaction model described by model B (for exam-
ple, if there are additional unobserved assets).
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(columns 7-4 and 7-5). This is notable because it suggests that much of the
apparent excess value is located in ﬁrms that have high levels both of IT
and of organizational assets. Note that, because we centered the interaction
terms, this is not due to a simple correlation between IT and its interaction
with ORG.
Second, the interaction of ORG with computer assets is signiﬁcant in
all speciﬁcations and is especially strong when we use a random-effects
or a robust regression technique (LAD) to perform the estimates (columns
7-5 and 7-6).
Third, this relationship appears to be unique to computer assets.
Although it appears that there is a small, positive interaction between
ORG and PP&E, this relationship is relatively weak and statistically sig-
niﬁcant only in the LAD regression. The interaction between ORG and
other assets is close to zero and inconsistent in sign.
As a ﬁnal check on the results, we also perform a ﬁxed-effects regres-
sion (column 7-7). Because ORG is time invariant, the interaction terms
have to be interpreted as the relationship between changes in asset quan-
tity (relative to the ﬁrm average) and changes in market value mediated
by the level of ORG. Here we obtain similar coefﬁcients on the interaction
terms, suggesting that the intangible assets we are capturing through the
interaction terms are not simply ﬁxed ﬁrm effects but the result of factors
that have varied, uniquely, at the ﬁrm level over time.
Taken together, these results suggest that ﬁrms that have large invest-
ments in computers have a disproportionately large amount of other intan-
gible assets, and that these ﬁrms account for a substantial portion of the
excess value of computers above and beyond the direct contributions of
ORG. This ﬁnding is consistent with the case literature on the comple-
mentarities between IT and organizational structure. It is also consistent
with the econometric ﬁnding of Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt,
71
using similar data, that ﬁrms that combine IT and ORG are disproportion-
ately more productive than ﬁrms with high levels of only one or the other.
Our interpretation is that, in addition to their direct effects on productiv-
ity, IT and ORG may be parts of a broader system of technologies and
practices that the ﬁnancial markets value but that is costly to implement.
Even if this system does not appear on ﬁrms’ balance sheets, it can be at
least partly identiﬁed by the simultaneous presence of high levels of two
observable assets: IT and ORG. 
71. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002).
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On the other hand, it is difﬁcult to reconcile this ﬁnding with the
hypothesis that the results are a manifestation of a bubble or similar per-
sistent mispricing by investors. That would require not only that a persis-
tent mispricing be correlated with IT and with ORG, but also that such a
persistent mispricing be disproportionately severe for those ﬁrms speciﬁ-
cally with high values of both variables simultaneously.
nonparametric estimation. The above results show that each dollar
of computer capital is associated with more intangible assets in high-ORG
ﬁrms than in ﬁrms that invest less in human capital and the other organi-
zational characteristics we identify. If the stock market is valuing these
ﬁrms properly, this suggests that the beneﬁts of computerization are likely
to go disproportionately to ﬁrms that have adopted the organizational
practices we identify.
Figure 1 captures this idea by plotting results from nonparametric
regressions. The ﬁgure is a level plot of ﬁtted values from a regression of
market value on both the computer capital and the ORG variables, after
netting out the inﬂuence of other variables. It presents a clear picture of
the interaction effect between computer assets and ORG. Firms that are
abundant in both computers and ORG have much higher market values
than ﬁrms that have one without the other. Moreover, market valuation is
disproportionately high in the quadrant where both asset levels are simul-
taneously above the median.
Intangible Assets and Productivity
One way to further distinguish the intangible asset hypothesis from
alternatives such as investor mispricing is to look at production functions.
If intangible assets really exist, they should be visible in the product mar-
kets as well as the ﬁnancial markets. In particular, if indeed these assets
are productive, ﬁrms possessing them should have higher future output.
Previous work documented the importance of organizational assets in a
production function framework and the existence of production comple-
mentarities between IT and organizational assets: ﬁrms with greater levels
of ORG had both greater investments in IT and higher productivity of
these investments.72
Using similar data on computers and output, but not considering the
effects of organizational assets explicitly, Brynjolfsson and Hitt con-
72. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002).
0675-03 BPEA/BHY  7/22/02  1:14 PM  Page 172Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin M. Hitt, and Shinkyu Yang 173
ducted a more detailed analysis of productivity growth and found that, as
longer time periods were considered, the relationship between computer
investment and productivity became stronger.73 They found that the long-
run productivity beneﬁts are approximately ﬁve times the direct capital
cost of computers, which would be consistent with a valuation of IT on
the order of ﬁve times the valuation of ordinary capital. Both of these pre-
vious results support our assertion that the market value relationships we
observe are consistent with the intangible assets hypothesis. However,
neither of these studies considered the relationship among computer
investment, organizational assets, and future output.
Table 8 reports production function estimates with IT and the inter-
action of IT with ORG lagged up to three periods. These regressions can
73. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2001).
Figure 1. Level Plot of Fitted Values from Nonparametric Regression of Market
Value on Computer and Organizational Assets
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be interpreted as identifying the relationship between current productivity
and past investment in IT. Column 8-1 reports results from a regression
that includes current-period IT, IT × ORG, and other production inputs
(capital, labor) as well as time and industry controls (the latter at the
1
1⁄2-digit SIC level).74 We ﬁnd that both IT and ORG and the IT × ORG
interaction make positive contributions to multifactor productivity in a
manner similar to results found by Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt.75
Moreover, the relationship among IT, ORG, and IT × ORG grows
stronger as we consider effects on output further in the future. Although
some of this rise is due to the change in the sample, a comparison with a
current-period regression (not shown) using the same sample shows that
the coefﬁcients are similar at one- and two-year lags, and larger at three-
year lags.
74. Our 1
1⁄2-digit controls divide the economy into ten sectors: high-technology manu-
facturing, process manufacturing, other nondurable manufacturing, other durable manufac-
turing, mining and construction, trade, transportation, utilities, ﬁnance, and other services.
See the appendix for details.
75. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002).
Table 8. OLS Regressions of Current Production on Past Computer 
and Organizational Assets, 1987–2000a
Dependent variable
Independent variable t t + 1t   + 2t   + 3
Computer assetst–1 0.045 0.047 0.043 0.045
(0.020) (0.025) (0.029) (0.036)
ORG × computer assetst 0.024 0.020 0.030 0.058
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
ORG 0.004 0.010 0.014 0.026
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026)
Capitalt
b 0.255 0.248 0.253 0.244
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
Labort
c 0.624 0.635 0.632 0.622
(0.035) (0.039) (0.049) (0.060)
Summary statistic
No. of observations 2,091 1,605 1,182 791
R2 0.835 0.836 0.849 0.839
Source: Authors’ regressions. See appendix for description of data sources.
a. The dependent variable is value added in constant dollars. All variables except ORG are expressed in natural logarithms.
The sample is restricted to 272 ﬁrms that have reported organizational assets. All regressions include controls for year and 
1
1⁄2-digit SIC industry. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
b. Ordinary capital stock in constant dollars, computed by the method described in B. Hall (1990). See appendix for details.
c. Labor expense in constant dollars. See appendix for details.
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A natural interpretation of these results is that they reﬂect the net
returns to a set of intangible assets, presumably some of the same intangi-
ble assets that investors are valuing. The fact that real output is higher for
such ﬁrms suggests that the investors’ beliefs have a reasonable economic
basis.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our results suggest that the organizational complements to ﬁrms’
installed computer capital are treated by investors as intangible assets.
The ﬁnancial markets treat the organizational assets associated with IT
much like other assets that increase long-term output and proﬁts. By cov-
ering several hundred ﬁrms over a period of eleven years, the analysis
helps to document and explain the extent to which computerization is
associated with both direct and indirect measures of intangible assets.
Furthermore, this approach helps reveal the pattern of interactions among
IT, organizational practices, and market valuations. If these assets are in
fact becoming more important in modern economies, in part because of
the information revolution engendered by computers and telecommunica-
tions, it is incumbent upon us to understand not only particular cases, but
also any broader relationships and patterns that exist in the data.
Our main results are consistent with each of the testable implications
about complementarities between computers and organizational design
described in the introduction: 
—The ﬁnancial markets put a higher value on ﬁrms with more installed
computer capital. The increase in market value associated with each
dollar of IT substantially exceeds the valuation placed on other types of
capital.
—Computer-intensive ﬁrms tend to have measurably different organi-
zational characteristics, involving teams, more broadly deﬁned jobs, and
greater decentralization of certain types of decisionmaking. 
—Firms with these organizational characteristics have higher market
valuations than their competitors, even when all their other measured
assets are the same.
—Firms with higher levels of both computer investment and these
organizational characteristics have disproportionately higher market valu-
ations than ﬁrms that invest heavily on only one or the other dimension. 
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or both have higher measured productivity in subsequent years.
Taken together, these results provide evidence that the combination of
computers and organizational structures creates more value than the sim-
ple sum of their separate contributions. The evidence is consistent with
the perception among many managers that IT is a catalyst for a broad set
of organizational changes. It is also consistent with the econometric evi-
dence that IT is more productive when combined with the speciﬁc cluster
of organizational practices that we measure. 
Our interpretation has focused on the assumption that the stock market
is approximately correct in the way it values IT and other capital invest-
ments. Although econometrics alone cannot rule out all forms of potential
omitted-variable bias, the evidence is not particularly consistent with
alternative explanations such as a stock market bubble during the
1987–97 period. The fact that our results apply to a broad cross section of
the economy over the ups and downs of a full business cycle suggests that
fads, industry idiosyncrasies, and investor errors are not solely driving the
results. Moreover, year-by-year estimation showed a consistently high
valuation of computer capital throughout the 1987–97 period, although
there is some evidence that valuations increased at the very end of the
sample. Our analysis also predates the large increase in the market value
of technology stocks in the late 1990s, and our sample is primarily com-
posed of large, established ﬁrms (from the Fortune 1000) rather than new
high-technology entrants. Indeed, we explicitly excluded information
technology–producing ﬁrms because the role of computers in software or
computer services ﬁrms is clearly different from the role they play in the
computer-using sectors. For this reason also, our results are less likely to
be sensitive to a high-technology stock bubble. 
The fact that these intangible assets that are correlated with computers
also appear to affect real production supports the hypothesis that the
intangible assets are important. We ﬁnd that our organizational assets
variable is also correlated with increased subsequent output. These results
appear to vindicate investors’ beliefs that these assets are valuable. None-
theless, it is also possible that some degree of mispricing has crept into
the estimates. Furthermore, our results do not necessarily apply to other
time periods or other types of ﬁrms or assets.
A particularly interesting ﬁnding is the signiﬁcance of the interaction
terms in our market value regressions. This result is difﬁcult to explain in
176 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
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simply reﬂect their shadow costs. Instead, it seems likely that we have
identiﬁed a cluster of ﬁrms that, through skill, foresight, or luck, are
endowed with a valuable form of business organization. Since the pre-
mium they command does not seem to have been quickly dissipated by
competition, it must be difﬁcult to imitate the speciﬁc technologies and
practices they have implemented. Simply buying a lot of computers and
implementing a stock set of practices such as we identify in our ORG
variable is presumably not enough. Although both these types of assets
are correlated with success as a business organization, much of the ice-
berg remains unidentiﬁed, and there is much that managers do not yet
fully understand or, at least, cannot easily implement.
Our results give some support to one view of the productivity slow-
down after 1973 and its revival in the 1990s. As several other researchers
have argued,76 the productivity slowdown may be explained by the
changes in the value of assets and reorganization accompanying the trans-
formation from a capital-intensive industrial economy to a computer-
intensive, information-based economy. This view is reinforced by Robert
Hall’s interpretation of investment in reorganization.77 In particular, the
evidence is consistent with the view that certain work practices are com-
plementary investments to computers, and the overall economic impact of
these practices is being recognized by both managers and investors.
APPENDIX
Data Sources and Description
The variables used for this analysis were constructed as follows.
Computer Assets
Direct measurements of the current market value of computer equip-
ment by ﬁrm are from Computer Intelligence Corp. Computer Intelligence
Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin M. Hitt, and Shinkyu Yang 177
76. Yorukoglu (1998); Greenwood (1997); Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999); Hobijn
and Jovanovic (2001).
77. R. Hall (2000b).
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constructs a table of market values for each model of computer and uses
this to calculate the current market value (replacement cost) of all comput-
ers owned by each ﬁrm. 
PP&E
We considered two options to construct the physical capital variable,
using data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat Annual Dataset. The ﬁrst,
following the method in B. Hall (1990), takes the gross book value of
physical capital stock (Compustat item 7: total gross PP&E) and deﬂates
it by the GDP implicit price deﬂator for ﬁxed investment. The deﬂator can
be applied at the calculated average age of the capital stock, based on the
three-year average of the ratio of total accumulated depreciation (calcu-
lated from Compustat item 8: total net PP&E) to current depreciation
(Compustat item 14: depreciation and amortization). 
The other, simpler method uses the net physical stock depreciation
(calculated from Compustat item 8). According to the productivity litera-
ture, the ﬁrst method should be used, but to conduct the market value esti-
mation we adopted the second approach to ensure consistency with
market value and other assets, which are measured in current dollars. The
dollar value of IT capital (as calculated above) was subtracted from this
result. 
Other Assets
The “other assets” variable was constructed as total assets (Compustat
annual data item 6) minus physical capital, as constructed above. This
item includes receivables, inventories, cash, and other accounting assets
such as goodwill reported by companies.
Market Value
Market value was calculated as the value of common stock at the end
of the ﬁscal year plus the value of preferred stock plus total debt. In Com-
pustat mnemonic code, this is MKVALF + PSTK + DT, which represents
the total worth of a ﬁrm as assessed by the ﬁnancial markets.
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R&D-to-Assets Ratio
The R&D-to-assets ratio was constructed from R&D expenses (Com-
pustat annual item 46). Interestingly, this item includes software expenses
and amortization of software investment. R&D stock was constructed
using the same rule as in B. Hall (1993a, 1993b). Fewer than half of the
ﬁrms in our sample reported R&D expenses. The missing values were
ﬁlled in using the averages for the same SIC four-digit industry.
Advertising-to-Assets Ratio 
We constructed the advertising-to-assets ratio from advertising expenses
(Compustat annual item 45). Fewer than 20 percent of our sample of
firms reported the item. We applied the same rule as for the R&D-to-
assets ratio.
Organization Variable
We constructed the ORG variable from items from a survey conducted
in 1995 and 1996. The construction procedure using principal components
analysis is described in the text. This variable captures the degree to
which ﬁrms have adopted new organizational practices as identiﬁed by
Osterman (1994), MacDufﬁe (1995), and Huselid (1995).
Value Added
This variable was calculated as constant-dollar sales less constant-
dollar materials. Sales (Compustat annual item 12) were deﬂated by price
indexes for each two-digit industry (from Gross Output and Related
Series published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis). When an industry
deﬂator was not available, we used the sector-level producer price index
for intermediate materials, supplies, and components (from the 1996 Eco-
nomic Report of the President). The value of materials was calculated by
subtracting undeﬂated labor expenses (calculated above) from total
expense and then deﬂating by the industry-level output deﬂator. Total
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expense was computed as the difference between operating income before
depreciation (Compustat annual item 13) and net sales (Compustat annual
item 12).
Ordinary Capital
This variable was computed from the total book value of capital
(equipment, structures, and all other capital) following the method in B.
Hall (1990). The gross book value of the capital stock (Compustat annual
item 7) was deﬂated by the GDP implicit price deﬂator for ﬁxed invest-
ment. The deﬂator was applied at the calculated average age of the capital
stock, based on the three-year average of the ratio of total accumulated
depreciation (calculated from Compustat annual item 8) to current depre-
ciation (Compustat annual item 14). This calculation of average age dif-
fers slightly from the method in B. Hall (1990), who made a further
adjustment for current depreciation. The constant-dollar value of IT capi-
tal (as calculated above) was subtracted from this result. Thus the sum of
ordinary capital and IT capital equals the total capital stock.
Labor Expense
Labor expense was either taken directly from Compustat (annual item
42) or, when this was not available, calculated as a sector-average labor
cost per employee multiplied by total employees (Compustat annual
item 29). The average labor expense per employee was taken from BLS
data on the hourly cost (including beneﬁts) of workers for ten sectors of
the economy. For ﬁrms whose labor expense as directly reported by Com-
pustat did not include beneﬁts, we adjusted the labor ﬁgure by multiply-
ing the reported labor expense by the ratio of total compensation to wages
for its sector as reported by the BLS.
1
1⁄2-Digit Industry Controls
The industry controls used in some of our analyses correspond to an
intermediate level between one- and two-digit Standard Industrial Classi-
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ﬁcation (SIC) codes. Based on the ﬁrm’s reported primary SIC code on
Compustat, we constructed the following control variables: mining and
construction, SIC 11 to 20; process manufacturing, SIC 26, 28, and 29;
other nondurable manufacturing, SIC 20 to 23 and 27; high-technology
manufacturing, SIC 36 to 38 and 3571 (computers); other durable manu-
facturing, SIC 24 to 25, 30 to 35 (except 3571), and 39; transportation,
SIC 40 to 47; utilities, SIC 48 to 49; trade, SIC 50 to 59; ﬁnance, SIC 60
to 69; and other services, SIC 70 to 79.
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Discussion
Martin Neil Baily: This paper is the latest chapter in a series of important
papers, by Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin Hitt, and Shinkyu Yang and other
coauthors, exploring the relationship between computers, on the one
hand, and economic performance (as measured by productivity and ﬁrm
market value), on the other. The basic message of this body of work is
that computers are very important, but that the success of companies that
use them depends on how they use them and on what other aspects of the
production process have changed.
This is a good story. It may very well be the right story, and it is a very
different story from the one that we heard in the 1980s, when productivity
growth was weak, and everybody was wondering why computers were not
contributing to the economy. For example, a student at MIT’s Sloan School
of Management, Gary Loveman, found that computer capital had had little
or no effect on productivity.1 In production function estimates, computer
capital had a coefﬁcient smaller than those on other kinds of capital.
Despite my sympathy with the overall story, I will raise some concerns
about the results in this paper. The paper comes at a time when econo-
mists, business decisionmakers, and policymakers are reassessing the
impact of information technology and its potential to fuel future economic
growth and increases in equity valuation. After the computer paradox of
the 1980s, there was an extravagant enthusiasm for IT in the 1990s, which
in turn was followed by a technology bust, led by the collapse of the dot-
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The basic motivation of the paper, presented in the authors’ table 1, is
their earlier ﬁnding that $1 worth of computer capital appears to con-
tribute $15 or so to a company’s market value. As the authors say, how-
ever, this cannot be a structural result. Since computers are not rationed,
this coefﬁcient, if taken literally, implies that companies could boost their
market value enormously just by buying computers. In the late 1990s
some companies may have actually thought that buying computers would
boost their market value, because indeed they bought them like there was
no tomorrow. But more seriously, this is not a sensible implication and
motivates attempts to explain what must be a nonstructural coefﬁcient.
Computer capital must be proxying for another variable, an unobserved
characteristic of the companies.
One possibility is that the market did not provide a rational evaluation
of the companies in this sample. And the market’s overvaluation may
have been associated with companies that were doing interesting things
that involved buying a lot of computers. Computer capital may have been
a proxy for irrational investor enthusiasm for the earnings growth poten-
tial of some companies. The authors argue that this cannot be the case
because their data end in 1997, whereas the technology bubble mostly
occurred after 1997. But the possibility of irrationality in the market was
there even earlier. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan warned of
irrational exuberance when the Dow Jones Industrial Average was only at
6,000. It would be surprising if irrational valuation could explain the
authors’ whole set of results, but it may explain part of the puzzle. I won-
der how computer capital would show up in a similar regression on com-
pany valuation today. 
The authors make the case that the missing variable is organizational
capital. This ties in with their overall conclusion that it is not the comput-
ers themselves but what you do with them that counts. The computer is a
building block of a much larger asset of the ﬁrm, namely, the whole orga-
nizational structure that it uses to produce and market its products or ser-
vices. The authors therefore construct a measure of organizational capital
based on observed characteristics of the companies in their sample.
Simply adding this variable to the valuation regression lowers the coef-
ﬁcient on computer capital from 14.6 to 11.5 (see their table 7, columns
7-1 and 7-2). But that is not a large change. The authors argue that the key
to further reducing the anomalously large coefﬁcient on computer capital
is to include an interaction term: organizational capital times computer
capital. When this term is added, the coefﬁcient on computer capital
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regression. That is a big improvement and an encouraging sign for their
hypothesis. But it still leaves something of a puzzle and a concern about
the interpretation of the results.
For one thing, the puzzle of the too-large coefﬁcient on computer
assets also extends to other types of capital.2 The coefﬁcient on PP&E
assets is consistently and signiﬁcantly above 1, and a company’s stock of
such capital is likely to far exceed that of its computer capital and may
have a much larger impact on its overall market value. This makes me
uneasy about the authors’ interpretation. Until we know what is driving
the anomalies in capital valuation, we cannot be sure that the true struc-
tural relations have been captured and that computers and their related
organizational capital are as important as the authors conclude.
One possibility is that the causality is going the other way: Those com-
panies that the market values highly may, for other reasons, buy a lot of
computers, and may indeed buy a lot of other capital as well. I have
argued elsewhere that some reverse causality may be at work in the pro-
ductivity literature. The standard growth accounting framework attributes
a very large fraction of the acceleration of productivity in the late 1990s to
investment in IT. But the fact that the surge in productivity coincided with
the surge in IT investment does not prove causality. In the late 1990s,
buying IT became the thing for companies to do, and the surge in output,
cash ﬂow, and productivity encouraged them to do it. Within the context
of this paper, those companies with high market valuations presumably
found it very easy to issue equity, ﬂoat bonds, and raise funds. The cost of
capital was very low, and the companies bought a lot of computers and
other capital, believing that this would pay off.
In the authors’ defense, they do ﬁnd that their results hold up in regres-
sions from 1987 and 1988, when buying computers was not such a big
deal. Nevertheless, I suspect that a bit of reverse causality may be taking
place. In the authors’ table 3, which presents year-by-year regressions, the
coefﬁcient on computer capital averages 13.3 over 1987–90, compared
with 19.3 over 1993–97. The coefﬁcient on PP&E rises almost monotoni-
cally over the period.
Another possibility is that there remain one or more omitted variables
in the regression even after the organizational capital has been accounted
for. The companies may have been doing something that showed up in
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wise). Perhaps the omitted variable is just business opportunities or inno-
vations created at certain companies. The market picked up these
companies’ prospects for future earnings growth. The companies needed
to make substantial investments to realize these opportunities, and they
bought capital. Adding to computer capital was particularly likely given
the nature of the new or expanded business opportunities that were
appearing during this period. After all, computers have become part of the
backbone of the economy. 
To defend the authors once again, they test for this problem by running
difference regressions to remove ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects. However, the
results from that analysis are a bit mixed. They ﬁnd (table 2) that the coef-
ﬁcient on computer capital falls to zero for one- and two-year differences
(and the coefﬁcient on PP&E falls closer to 1). As the time difference
increases, however, the coefﬁcients on computer capital and other capital
rise way back up again. I do not know quite what to make of that. One
could argue that, because of creative destruction, the potential market
value of an innovation or a new business opportunity could be fairly
ephemeral. A business opportunity comes along, market value goes up,
the company buys a bunch of computers, and then competitors come in
and the opportunity to generate excess returns is competed away. The fact
that the computer capital coefﬁcient comes back so strongly after such a
short time difference makes that a somewhat harder story to tell. But the
bottom line is that the ﬁrst-difference equations do seem a red ﬂag that
part of what is picked up here is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristic that happens
to be correlated with computer buying.
I turn now to a different issue. The thrust of this paper is that computer
capital is central to strong business performance, as shown by market
value or by productivity. There is some literature that questions this
hypothesis on the basis of ﬁndings from industry case studies—in partic-
ular, the work on IT and productivity by the McKinsey Global Institute
(MGI).3
That report concludes that the surge of IT spending after 1995 was not
the main reason for the surge in productivity growth. Productivity and
proﬁtability are not the same. It is possible that the companies that
invested heavily in IT were able to gain a competitive advantage that
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was not greatly enhanced. But that is not what the MGI report ﬁnds. On
the contrary, it ﬁnds that the companies that invested heavily in IT often
achieved no better performance than those that failed to invest.
For example, the MGI case study of retailing suggested that a lot of
what Wal-Mart did was not related directly to IT. Wal-Mart and other
retailers made many operational improvements that did not depend on IT,
notably the shift to big-box stores, which provided scale economies. In
the retail sector more broadly, the increase in consumers’ income over
time allowed companies to increase the value added of the products they
sell, and this increased their measured productivity.
Again in fairness to the authors of this paper, there are different per-
spectives on what is happening at the industry and the ﬁrm level, and at
Wal-Mart in particular. Wal-Mart’s is a very IT-intensive operation, and
the company’s organizational structure allows it to take advantage of the
knowledge base the IT generates. But the MGI study, along with the work
of some other New Economy skeptics, does raise a serious challenge.
How central is IT to successful business performance? Some amount of
IT is surely essential to function in a modern economy. But the jury is still
out on whether IT is the key element for success, or an enabling technol-
ogy that requires other changes and innovations and may or may not pay
off, or indeed a distraction or hindrance as companies overinvested.
I would vote for the second proposition, and I assume the authors of
this paper would, too. But I have been struck by conversations I have had
with some consultants who serve IT vendors. In many or even a majority
of cases, the expected performance beneﬁts the vendors promised their
customers have not yet materialized. The authors of this paper mention
enterprise resource planning (ERP) software as an example of how the
total cost of installing a complete IT system greatly exceeds the cost of
the hardware alone. Indeed, I have heard stories about customers who
signed up for ERP software and ended up paying and paying and never
really achieving the promised cost savings. There is a joke in the software
industry that installing certain ERP software is like pouring wet cement
into a business’ operations. The cement hardens and destroys ﬂexibility
and innovation.
To conclude, the authors are going down the right road. They are ask-
ing how IT interacts with operational factors and intangible capital, and
what combination of these things enhances market value. I entirely agree
186 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
0675-03 BPEA/BHY  7/22/02  1:14 PM  Page 186with their strategy for future research: they just need to go farther down
that road, to increase our conﬁdence that they are really capturing a struc-
tural relation between computers and market valuation.
Robert E. Hall: A theme of recent work on wage differentials is that
workers who know how to use computers earn a lot more than those who
do not. This interesting paper by Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang illustrates
the same principle for ﬁrms: those that know how to harness modern
information technology within their business models are worth a lot more
than those that do not. Although this ﬁnding itself is not surprising, the
magnitude is: a dollar of extra investment in IT brings a $15 increase in
the investing ﬁrm’s stock market value. The market infers the ﬁrm’s use
of modern, efﬁcient business processes from the presence of extra IT
investments on its balance sheet. The authors argue strenuously—and
successfully in my view—that this inference is rational and not the result
of a bubble in the market for shares of computer-intensive ﬁrms. The
authors also make it clear that they do not see the high marginal valuation
of IT capital as a failure of the principle that a ﬁrm should continue to
invest in all forms of capital until the marginal dollar of investment adds
just a dollar to market value. Rather, the spectacular coefﬁcient of 15 on
IT capital is an iceberg ratio: for every dollar of visible capital, there is
$14 worth of invisible investments in business processes.
The divergent experiences of the two biggest players in big-box 
retailing—Wal-Mart and Kmart—are the perfect example of the paper’s
theme. The stock market values Wal-Mart, the leader in modern comput-
erized retailing, at six times the book value of its assets. Yet Kmart, with
virtually the same retailing model, is in bankruptcy. Thanks to the
advanced IT systems Wal-Mart has implemented, a manager at Wal-
Mart’s headquarters knows vastly more about what is on the shelves of a
Wal-Mart store in another part of the country than a local Kmart manager
knows about what is on the shelves of his or her own store. Wal-Mart’s
systems make possible a completely Stalinesque organization involving
an astonishing 1.4 million employees. It is wonderfully ironic that the
dreams of the Soviet central planners have come true—thanks to modern
information technology—in a worldwide empire run from a small town in
Arkansas rather than from Moscow. 
As the authors stress, their paper is about Wal-Mart and the other users
of modern technology, not about the producers of that technology. Their
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worth recording, however, that the foundation of modern IT is a pair of
general-purpose technologies. One is the generic server—basically a
souped-up personal computer. Because servers are the product of a com-
petitive computer hardware industry, their prices have fallen to essentially
zero by comparison with computer prices of a decade or so ago. The other
technology is database software: generic software that can keep track of
practically inﬁnite information about a practical inﬁnity of objects. Wal-
Mart could never manage its empire without the capabilities of modern
database management.
The basic ﬁnding that motivates this paper—the extremely high value
that the stock market places on an incremental dollar of IT investment—
has been reported in a series of earlier papers by Brynjolfsson and his
coauthors. The starting point is Martin Baily’s value revelation principle:
that the stock market (or, more accurately, the totality of ﬁnancial claims)
should measure the value of the real assets of a ﬁrm. Absent a correlation
between the unmeasured components of a ﬁrm’s real portfolio and the
measured components, each measured component should receive a value
of 1 in a regression of total value on the components. When the observed
coefﬁcient is different from 1, we conclude that there is a correlation with
an unmeasured component. The big news from the earlier papers was the
extreme size of that unmeasured component.
The value added by this paper is in bringing in new information that
bears directly on the unmeasured component. This information relates to
organizational design: use of teams and team-based incentives, individual
decisionmaking authority, and investment in skills and education. The
authors blend the information into a single measure, which they call ORG.
This measure is standardized to have a zero mean and unit variance. Thus
it lacks the appropriate conceptual basis for inclusion in the regressions of
market value on value components, because it is not a value at all. Data
are not available to measure the cost of ﬁrms’ investments in organiza-
tional design or even the investments that such designs call for, such as
training. All of these costs are expensed along with normal operating
costs and cannot be recovered from any standard ﬁnancial accounts. 
The paper uses ORG to explain the surprising ﬁndings of the basic
value regressions. Interpretation of these regressions requires attention to
the nature of the ORG variable and to the underlying framework of the
regression. First, the left-hand-side variable is the value of the ﬁrm in mil-
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ably to take account of the huge range in values. The capital value vari-
ables of the basic regression are so scaled—they, too, are in millions of
dollars—and the authors scale ORG by the number of employees. The
addition of the scaled ORG variable lowers the coefﬁcient on IT from 15
to 11, suggesting that some of the correlation of value with IT is better
captured by ORG.
The authors’ tables 7 and 8 include versions of ORG scaled by various
types of capital. One could place these results into the basic framework by
hypothesizing that each ﬁrm’s organizational investment per dollar of IT
investment is proportional to its ORG value. The coefﬁcient on IT drops
to 5 when the various proxies for organizational capital are included. In
this interpretation, about two-thirds of the iceberg portion of the IT capi-
tal coefﬁcient is attributable to the fact that ORG scaled by various types
of capital serves as a proxy for organizational capital. That is an impres-
sive ﬁnding. 
The authors, however, do not rest with this interpretation of their ﬁnd-
ings. Instead, they go on to write, “This ﬁnding is consistent with the case
literature on the complementarities between IT and organizational struc-
ture.” I think this is a misunderstanding of the basic framework. Baily’s
value revelation principle applies to capital inputs irrespective of how
they enter the production function. A competitive, optimizing ﬁrm has a
market value equal to the sum of the values of its different kinds of capi-
tal, whether those kinds of capital are substitutes, complements, or some-
thing in between. No conclusion about complementarities can follow
from the approach taken in this paper—to do so would require estimation
of the technology, not a study of value.
The results show that ORG does not capture some of the important fea-
tures of what I suspect accounts for the extra $14 or $15 valuation of a
dollar of IT investment. In particular, it is not clear to me that Wal-Mart is
a high-ORG ﬁrm or that the principles that go into Wal-Mart’s stunning
success have much to do with the factors measured by ORG. Here I will
take advantage of the fact that I am one of the few economists interested
in this subject who shops extensively at Wal-Mart. The success of Wal-
Mart, I believe, comes from two main factors. First, its logistical perfor-
mance is phenomenal. Its shelves are always well stocked. Even at the
height of the busiest seasons, what you want is on the shelf. This perfor-
mance is directly related to the centralized database system that lies at the
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the art of inducing ordinary people to do their jobs well. I believe much of
this is also centralized: Wal-Mart has developed managerial procedures
for employee accountability that the company applies relentlessly in all its
stores. As a result, whereas Kmart’s shelves are disorganized and bereft
of the things people really want, and the employees are sullen and unhelp-
ful, Wal-Mart has ﬁgured out how to make 1.4 million people work
together to put what people want on the shelves and help them ﬁnd it. 
One of the interesting puzzles about modern business is the role of cen-
tralization and decentralization. Modern business processes based on IT
have created amazingly successful large, centralized organizations. Wal-
Mart is the leader, of course, but Dell Computer and Southwest Airlines
are other prominent examples. On the other hand, variables measuring
structural and individual decentralization are key ingredients of ORG and
of discussions of successful modern ﬁrms. Success seems to require the
adroit combination of the beneﬁts of centralization of data management
with decentralization of certain aspects of work.
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Figure 1. Wal-Mart Share Price, Adjusted for Splits, 1987–2002a
Source: Yahoo! Finance data.








1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Dollars
0675-03 BPEA/BHY  7/22/02  1:14 PM  Page 190It will come as no surprise that I am completely in agreement with the
authors’ conclusion that their valuation results are not just another reﬂec-
tion of a high-technology bubble in the stock market. To illustrate, my ﬁg-
ure 1 shows the history of Wal-Mart’s share price since 1987. The shaded
area is the period most often considered that of a high-technology bubble,
from the beginning of 1999 through March 2000. Wal-Mart did enjoy a
sharp appreciation during the high-technology boom, but as the market
sorted out the winners and losers, Wal-Mart plainly emerged as a winner.
As of April 2002, the company enjoyed a stock market value quite close
to its transitory peak during the high-tech frenzy of 1999.
The authors are candid in stating that they see this paper as only a ﬁrst
installment on the fascinating topic of understanding and explaining the
iceberg of IT valuation. I hope that ultimately they are able to develop
good direct measures of other types of capital, which, when included in
their value regressions, will drive the coefﬁcient on IT capital down to its
proper value of 1.
General discussion: Several panel members expressed skepticism about
the authors’ interpretation of the large coefﬁcients on computer assets and
on the term interacting computer assets with organizational capital in their
valuation equations. The authors claimed that these results show that
computer capital is associated with signiﬁcant intangible investment in
organizational capital. Christopher Sims observed that these right-hand-
side variables could just as well be regarded as dependent variables,
“explained” by market valuation. For example, the authors’ estimates of
the effects of computer assets could be interpreted as saying that ﬁrms
valued highly by the market, for any of a wide variety of reasons, take
advantage of the resulting low cost of capital to purchase computers.
Kevin Murphy concurred, remarking that the authors’ analysis was like
running a regression on house prices in which the number of bathrooms,
the number of bedrooms, and so on are included as explanatory variables,
and ﬁnding that the coefﬁcient on a Jacuzzi variable was $120,000. No
one would interpret that coefﬁcient as implying that a Jacuzzi adds that
much to a house’s value. 
Sims noted that the interpretation of the coefﬁcient on the interacted
variable, ORG × computer assets, is subject to the same problems as that
of computer assets alone. This variable might be picking up a factor that
inﬂuences how investments are ﬁnanced, rather than any effect of tech-
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promised if the ﬁrm is making unobservable investments in training and
organizational restructuring, which bankers do not readily accept as col-
lateral, as opposed to investing in traditional physical capital. If this were
the case, the interacted variable might reﬂect the degree to which a ﬁrm
had ﬁnanced itself with equity capital instead of debt. The extraordinary
performance of the stock market during the recent period would then
result in large coefﬁcient estimates. Sims further noted that if the skills
embodied in the organization variable are scarce, the consultants and
managers who have those skills—not the equity holders—should be col-
lecting the rents. He commented that the contemporaneous nature of the
regressions makes it difﬁcult to identify causality, and increases in equity
value may actually precede investment in computers and organization. He
acknowledged that it may not be practical to specify and estimate a model
that includes equations for all the endogenous variables, or to ﬁnd satis-
factory instruments for computer investment. But he thought there should
be more discussion of the potential biases in the results and of alternative
interpretations.
William Brainard observed that coefﬁcients on physical capital signiﬁ-
cantly above 1 call into question the underlying assumption of the analy-
sis, namely, that market values accurately reﬂect the value of a ﬁrm’s
constituent parts. He noted that in the authors’ year-by-year regressions
the coefﬁcient estimates on physical plant and equipment increased sys-
tematically over time, from about 1.0 in 1987 to more than 1.8 in 1997.
The coefﬁcient on PP&E is approximately 1.5 in the pooled regressions,
which include time dummies. He noted that the dramatic rise in overall
market q during the period made it essential to distinguish the valuation
effects of cross-sectional variation from those of time variation in com-
puter assets. Brainard was not satisﬁed with the authors’ attempt to make
this distinction by using time dummies in pooled regressions. With the
regressions estimated in levels, increases in overall market value during
the period show up as the same dollar addition to the value of every ﬁrm
independent of the size of the ﬁrm. Hence the growth in overall market q
will be embedded in the coefﬁcients on PP&E and on computer assets.
The coefﬁcients cannot be interpreted as arising only from the cross-
sectional variation in asset composition. Nor can one say how much of the
coefﬁcient on computer assets simply reﬂects their growing importance in
the later periods when market valuations in general were high. 
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by the authors’ estimates and interpretation. The authors reported the
stock of this capital as being between $1.5 trillion and $2 trillion. William
Nordhaus observed that these numbers are consistent with Dale Jorgen-
son’s ﬁnding of no surge in total factor productivity once investment in
information technology is taken into account. Both Nordhaus and Sims
urged the authors to extend their analysis to include earnings as well as
market valuations, noting that their results would be strengthened if the
story told in the paper were reﬂected in earnings. Nordhaus noted that
although one could view the results as showing that supernormal returns
result from a synergistic interaction between computers and organization,
if instead they reﬂect intangible assets with normal returns, as the authors
believe, there should be a particular time pattern of earnings. Earnings
should be lower at the beginning of a period of intangible investment and
higher later, as the intangible capital accumulates. He suggested that the
authors examine earnings to see whether this pattern emerges. 
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